Chopper wrote:Interesting read, Schnellfuer. I recall a bit of that from Ghost Force. What particularly amused me was his criticism of the modern SAS and its limp wristed approaches these days. I know the father of one of the guys that was a member of Bravo two zero, and that was a tense time for him. But I'm inclined to agree with Conner, they f*cked up as much as the British govt did. Part time SAS indeed. I also thought it interesting that he thought the SAS should be disbanded.
Yeah McNab serially fkd up. Perhaps it was because guys from A squadron or whichever one it was were thrown out there last minute scrounging ammo and kit. Then you have basic common sense: they didn't know it was cold in Iraq at night in January. WTF?! Of course, this should have been a mobile op and the 'troops' should have dug their heels in. But ultimately, the fish rots from the head and the Director of SF at that time was a rupert moron. As Connor described in his book, kit for these types of ops used to be on the shelf - these days it's all gone somewhere else ... He has a point about disbandment. In the old days 22 could get on a plane, resolve a coup attempt with fists and be gone before the FCO could blink, blend in etc. These days they advertise SF jobs, higher pay, always the option to join special recon regiment instead etc. In the old days you had to want to join: pass selection, get bumped backed down to "private" (trooper) and same pay, work your way back up again. Now it's the US thing, become an "operator", get expert with an M4 Carbine 'short' with about 5 laser sights hanging off it (no use at range in Afghanistan - unless you are shooting back at a twitchy PMC in a Kabul street), look for the next promotion etc. There's also a lack of understanding (even respect) of the various enemies that was there before, an inability to select the right bits of kit to get a job done, often basic and reliable kit is better than expensive but fragile.
I guess the last time SAS went relatively unilateral and were alllowed to get on was in Bosnia (to a certain extent) then in Sierra Leone 2000 defending Freetown 2 Para turned up.
Chopper wrote:I may not be in the military, but I've read enough on the Malay (Emergency) and other little skirmishes to know what a well trained SF force is capable of. Their real claim to fame is surviving in sh*t conditions without need for resupply. Not so much their tactics or Rambo nature. And B2Z certainly failed there. Approaching civvies? Gimme a break.
The secret war in Oman is another the Brits have forgotten. Two SAS squadrons successfully stabilised Oman against insurgents from Yemen, even using former insurgents as support. The other problem of the bureacratisation of Special Forces is that, instead of a team getting free rein to use their initiative, you get jobsworths wanting sitreps via satphone every 12 hours, plus giving orders not based on what's happening on the ground. The ultimate failure of SF in Iraq 1 is perhaps reflected in the head shed corralling the troops for the huge attack on Victor Two telecoms relay centre, this was done just to get a 'triumph' at any cost for the head shed and attached ruperts.
Chopper wrote:My Dad was in the NZ Wildlife service, one of his jobs was to trap and tag trout for scientific study. A lot of the local Maori's were breaking into the fish traps and pinching fish. SO the NZ govt let them borrow some Kiwi SAS troopers to stakeout and photograph the poachers. One guy dug a foxhole in a Blackberry bush, a poacher stood over him and pissed on his head completely oblivious to the fact the trooper was 1 foot away from him. Imagin his surprise in court

That's very SAS. One of the Boat Troop guys killed in Sierra Leone on Op Barras had been sitting with an SBS stick in a swamp just off from the village they were monitoring. They were in that swamp for a week
Chopper wrote:Needless to say politics should NEVER get in the way of the Military. The first role of govt is to protect its citizens and the NZ govt failed miserably. Problem is, and I spoke to the minister of Defence, is the idiots won't do anything as there is no perceived threat. I gave up at that point. Its basic fuckin logic. When there is a threat, its too bloody late.
Yeah, it's not as if NZ doesn't have 'local' political-security interests too, military and police used in Tonga briefly but of course on RAMSI too and the Kiwis have a hell of a better set of skills at interacting with fellow Pacific Islanders (and that's what the Aussies say...) Even Vanuatu's paramilitaries help peace-support operations from Timor to Africa, NZ could easily make more of a contribution.
Chopper wrote:I'm a Libertarian, and while we advocate restricting govt as much as possible, the Armed Forces and Police are the MOST important part of any society, problem is the politicians call the shots and will use them for material gain. Corruption at its best. Just look at the US military, its gone from a joke to a frace.
Yeah, the primary function - well, the raison d'etre - for a successful modern state/polity is provide security via legitimate popular mandates. Otherwise, why do you need a state? Wherever the state is weak other power centres emerge, that's just sociology in action. For the US military, I don't have much sympathy, they still have an insane budget but fugg up on a regular basis. The problem is that, since Ulysses Grant, the US military has been set up - like the Soviets were - for one thing only: the overwhelming concentration of mass at a critical point. They are starting to get with the programme, the current ops in Helmand (and 12th Mountain Division in Wardak) show some more creative thinking.
But, if we start dissecting the US, we'll go even more off topic!
